Democracies in crisis, or rather liberal democracy at a crossroads?

KEY TAKEAWAYS

• The multiple crises of liberal democracy: Romania, Georgia, the U.S., France, Germany, South Korea.

• Democracy vs. liberalism: The current crisis affects not democracy per se, but the synthesis of liberal democracy, highlighting tensions between democratic and liberal principles, i.e., popular sovereignty, majority rule, equality, and freedom on the one hand, and individual rights and freedoms, minority protections, liberal legalism and constitutionalism and limited government on the other.

• Western fault lines and populism’s rise: In the West, contradictions between democracy and liberalism are evident, with populist parties demanding a realignment in the balance of power between democratic and liberal principles. Populist movements are a reaction against liberal elites perceived as unaccountable, reflecting dissatisfaction with constraints on democratic sovereignty.

• Global shifts: The decline of U.S. hegemony weakens liberal values globally. The liberal international order, once seen as inevitable, now appears to be increasingly out of step with the realities of a post-unipolar world in a post-Western era.

• Economic discontent: Disillusionment with economic liberalism post-2008 has fuelled protectionism and economic nationalism, weakening the liberal-democratic consensus.

• Core question and future scenarios: The fate of liberal democracy hinges on reconciling liberal and democratic principles; failure to do so may force societies to choose between illiberal democracies or liberal authoritarianism.

~

Although we have been repeatedly warned how populism (however defined) threatens democracies and about the dangers posed to democracies by “autocracies” in a democracies-versus-autocracies binary, something seems to be quite amiss in the democratic camp as well. In Romania, an EU country, presidential elections in toto were cancelled between the first and the second round—not because of meddling with ballot boxes, vote counts, or voter registries, but because one candidate was deemed to be too visible on a private popular social media platform, TikTok. Now, that candidate has been conclusively barred from participating in the upcoming elections.

In France, the highest-polling presidential candidate was barred from running for French president in 2027. Meanwhile in Georgia, a new president has been elected by the 300-seat electoral college dominated by the governing pro-European Georgian Dream party, but the previous and more-pro-EU president Salome Zourabichvili did not recognise the legitimacy of the procedure. During the electoral period in the U.S., the homeland of checks and balances, Kamala Harris declared the incoming president a “fascist” that is “unfit for office,” whereas Donald Trump does not shy away from declaring the 2020 presidential elections as “stolen,” entailing their illegitimacy.

In both Germany and France, parties increasingly gaining traction in electoral procedures face a coalition of other parties so that they may remain banned from government irrespective of electoral results. The UK finds itself in a never-ending political crisis with Farage’s Reform party on the rise, while South Korea, often touted as a prototypical Western liberal democracy in Asia, saw a six-hour quasi-coup d’état, which involved the imposition of martial law with the pretext of protecting liberal democracy, summarily wrapped up due to abject failure. The above is a crude summary, yet the question becomes unavoidable: what’s going on with democracies? Phrased differently: what is truly ailing democracies today?

The heart of this question lies not in democracy itself, but in the compound term “liberal democracy” which is usually meant by “democracy” today—a synthesis that now appears strained to the point of rupture. This analysis explores the nature of that crisis, drawing a crucial distinction between democracy, with its roots in majority rule, popular sovereignty, equality and freedom, and the public expression of the collective general will of the people, and liberalism, which prioritises individual rights and freedoms, minority protections, (liberal) legalism and constitutionalism, and limited government. The tension between democratic and liberal principles, long papered over, is now erupting with destabilising consequences for political systems worldwide.

Democracy and liberalism did not always walk hand in hand. Historically, democracy—characterised by majority rule, popular sovereignty, equality, and freedom—existed independently of liberal principles; it operated without a framework of top-down norms limiting the “tyranny of the majority.” Liberalism, on the other hand, emerged much later as a distinct ideological force, advocating for limited government, individual rights and freedoms, and the rule of law.

The merging of democratic and liberal principles into “liberal democracy” was more a marriage of convenience than a seamless integration. The revolutions of the late 18th and 19th centuries—particularly the French and American revolutions—necessitated a balance between the power of the majority and the rights of the individual. Liberalism feared the potential tyranny of majorities, while democracy sought to curb the power of unaccountable elites. The synthesis worked, but uneasily.

Liberalism has always harboured a deep suspicion of unfettered democratic power. This suspicion grew more pronounced in the 20th century, as liberal elites sought to insulate governance from what they viewed as the irrational passions of the populace. The institutions of liberal democracy—courts, bureaucracies, international bodies—were designed not just to uphold rights, but to check majoritarian impulses. This worked well in an era where liberal values held hegemonic sway. But when those values began to falter, the tensions within the system became harder to ignore.

The 21st century has seen the resurgence of populism—a political phenomenon best understood not as an attack on democracy, but as a symptom of the contradictions within liberal democracy itself. Populist movements, whether on the left or right, typically articulate a demand for greater popular control over decision-making processes that have been sequestered by what they diagnose as liberal elites—“liberal” here alluding to liberalism, not to a left/right divide per se. When British voters backed Brexit, they claimed to repudiate a liberal cosmopolitan order that, to them, seemed indifferent to their democratic will. When American voters supported Donald Trump, they claimed to be challenging a liberal establishment (including courts, media, academia unelected officials, think tanks etc.) that, in their view, had ceased to be accountable to them, the people, the citizenry, the body politic.

Populism, often decried as a threat to democracy, can be viewed as a democratic critique of liberalism. Populist movements demand greater popular control over decisions that liberal elites have insulated from public debate. Issues like immigration, trade policy, foreign affairs, and national sovereignty are often decided and/or determined by technocrats, unelected officials and bureaucrats, courts, or international organisations, with limited input from voters. When citizens demand a say on these issues, they are labelled as populists—a term that often carries a pejorative connotation.

Moreover, populist movements express dissatisfaction with the constraints imposed by liberal institutions. This dissatisfaction does not necessarily stem from hostility to democracy, but from a belief that liberalism has undermined democratic sovereignty. Populism, therefore, is not primarily an external threat to liberal democracy but rather an internal symptom of its inherent contradictions. It reflects a demand for realignment in the balance of power between democratic and liberal principles. Ignoring this demand, or dismissing it as irrational, risks deepening the crisis.

Liberal responses to these movements have often been defensive, if not outright disdainful. The rhetoric of “populism” serves as a catch-all for political expressions that defy liberal orthodoxy. Hillary Clinton’s characterisation of Trump supporters as a “basket of deplorables” in 2016 exemplified this elitist fear of an unruly majority. In Europe, mainstream parties routinely form “cordons sanitaires” to exclude populists from government, regardless of electoral outcomes. These defensive manoeuvres highlight the extent to which liberalism now views democratic and electoral procedures—or, at least, certain democratic outcomes—as a threat, to which there must be a defence in the name of democracy. But which democracy of the two?

The liberal crisis is not confined to liberal democracy within the West. The international order, once shaped by the liberal hegemonic power of the United States, is undergoing seismic systemic shifts. After the Second World War and through the Cold War, American dominance helped spread liberal values across Europe and beyond. The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 seemed to confirm the triumph of liberalism. Yet the global reach of an ideology is tied to the power of its sponsor. As American influence wanes, so too does the global appeal of liberalism.

Emerging powers such as China, Russia, and even India do not prioritise liberal principles—often explicitly noting that “there is no one-size-fits-all template to guide countries in establishing democracy”, a not too thinly veiled reference to the exclusivist claim of liberal democracy to the question of democracy at large. In Central Europe, countries like Hungary, Slovakia and Poland openly challenge the liberal consensus while maintaining majoritarian democratic legitimacy. The liberal international order, once seen as inevitable, now appears to be a historically contingent phase, increasingly out of step with the realities of a post-unipolar world in a post-Western era, at least insofar as its exclusivist claims are concerned.

Within Western nations, the contradictions between democracy and liberalism are growing more acute. For some conservatives, the “liberal establishment”—including courts, media, and academia—represents a hostile force that undermines democratic sovereignty. For others, “populist” majorities represent a threat to civil rights and institutional stability.

The rise of populist parties exposes the limits of liberal tolerance for democratic outcomes and raises uncomfortable questions about the balance between liberal principles and democratic legitimacy. The tension is palpable: liberalism seeks to protect against the tyranny of the majority, while democracy insists on the primacy of majority rule. The liberal-democratic synthesis, i.e., liberal democracy, once thought to be the pinnacle of political evolution, now seems to contain the seeds of its own undoing.

The internal contradictions of liberal democracy may lead to a liberalism that discards democratic legitimacy and the will of the majority, and impose policies regardless of popular consent, or a democracy that jettisons safeguards of political liberalism and tramples on individual and minority rights.

Illiberal democracies retain the forms of democratic legitimacy but undermine liberal principles of individual rights and judicial independence. These regimes argue that liberal constraints impede the will of the majority, a will they claim to embody. Their critics, both domestic and international, accuse them of dismantling democracy itself—identifying or conflating democracy per se with liberal democracy. Yet democracy has historically functioned without liberalism. On the other hand, liberal authoritarianism might arise when liberal elites, fearing the rise of populism, resort to undemocratic means to maintain their interests or impose their liberal values regardless of popular consent. This can manifest through judicial activism, censorship under the guise of combating misinformation, or international bodies overriding national sovereignty.

Both scenarios—illiberal democracy and liberal authoritarianism—highlight the fragility of the current liberal-democratic synthesis. The question facing Western societies is whether democratic and liberal principles can be reconciled, or whether the separation between democracy and liberalism is inevitable.

The crisis of liberal democracy is not merely political; it is also economic. The post-Cold War era saw the triumph of economic liberalism, characterised by free markets, globalisation, and deregulation. This model, while benefiting certain sectors and regions, left many communities and social groups behind. The 2008 financial crisis exposed the fragility of this system and led to widespread disillusionment with economic liberalism.

In response, protectionist policies—once anathema to economic liberals—have gained traction. The Biden administration’s embrace of “friendshoring” reflected a trade bloc logic, while the Trump administration’s tariffs on foreign goods reflect the weaponization of trade and a broader trend of economic nationalism. These policies undermine the principles of free trade and globalisation that were central to post-war liberalism.

The politicisation of the economy—whether through tariffs, trade blocs, the weaponization of the U.S. dollar, or strategic decoupling—signals a retreat from economic liberalism. This retreat is not limited to the right; left-wing movements also call for greater state intervention and protection of national industries. The consensus that once supported economic liberalism has fractured, further weakening the ideological and social foundations of liberal democracy.

So, is democracy under threat, or is it liberalism that finds itself in crisis? The evidence suggests that while democracy faces challenges, the deeper crisis lies in the retreat of Western liberalism and the internal contradictions of liberal democracy, which are now more evident than ever. The tension between liberal and democratic principles has reached a breaking point. Liberal democracy, once thought to be the final form of governance, now appears as a contingent synthesis—one that may or may not survive the current wave of populism, economic nationalism, and geopolitical realignment.

The future may see a decoupling of liberalism and democracy, with societies choosing either illiberal democracies or liberal authoritarianisms. Ultimately, the fate of liberal democracy depends on whether democratic and liberal principles can be reconciled.

Dimitris B. Peponis

Dimitris B. Peponis holds an MA in Governance and Public Policies from the University of the Peloponnese’s Department of Political Science and International Relations and is the author of “The End of the Great Deviation: From Ukraine and the Pandemic to the Shaping of the New Global Order” (Topos books, in Greek).